

Message Text

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ACTION A-01

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 211
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS
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AMEMBASSY LONDON
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USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USMISSION USNATO
USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES
EUCOM
USCINCEUR
AMCONSUL ADANA
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
AMCONSUL IZMIR
USSN MR SHAPE

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 ANKARA 0331

LIMDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y TEXT PARA 4

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, TU
SUBJECT: US-TURKISH RELATIONS: CODEL WILLIAMS/STEVENS

1. IN COURSE OF CODEL'S SIX HOUR STOPOVER IN ANKARA
JANUARY 13, SENATE MEMBERS (WILLIAMS, STEVENS, CANNON,
RIBICOFF AND HOLLINGS) AND AMBASSADOR MET SUCCESSIVELY WITH
FOREIGN MINISTER, PRIME MINISTER ECEVIT, OPPOSITION LEADER
DEMIREL, AND PRESIDENT KORUTURK. ALL EXCEPT ONE HOUR
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DISCUSSION WITH ECEVIT WERE ESSENTIALLY PROTOCOL CALLS,
BUT PRIME MINISTER USED OPPORTUNITY FOR A FRANK AND FULL
EXPOSITION OF HIS VIEWS AND APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL
PROBLEMS TURKEY FACES. AMONG TOPICS DISCUSSED:

A. DEMOCRACY IN TURKEY. ECEVIT STRESSED THAT
TURKEY WAS ONLY ONE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WHICH

HAD A CONTINUOUSLY FUNCTIONING DEMOCRACY SINCE
WORLD WAR II. IT HAD SUFFERED "POLITICAL ACCIDENTS"
BUT NO FUNDAMENTAL DISRUPTIONS. RECENT GOVERNMENTAL
CHANGEOVER BY NO CONFIDENCE VOTE IN PARLIAMENT WAS "A FIRST" FOR
TURKEY, REPRESENTING A POLITICAL MATURING PROCESS AND SHOULD
BE WELCOMED AS A SIGN THAT DEMOCRACY IS HERE TO STAY.
UNFORTUNATELY TURKEY HAD SUFFERED A PERIOD OF INTERNAL CRISES
OVER PAST 3-4 YEARS WHICH HAD RESULTED IN A STATE OF
"SUSPENSION" FOR TURKISH POLICY BOTH INTERNAL
AND INTERNATIONAL.

B. RELATIONS WITH US. ALL TURKISH PARTIES SUPPORT
CONTINUATION AND RESTORATION OF COOPERATION WITH THE
US AND TURKEY'S TRADITIONAL ALLIES IN THE WEST. HE
FELT BALANCE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST WAS A DELICATE
ONE, THAT TURKEY WAS A "VITAL ELEMENT" IN THIS
BALANCE, WHICH IT WOULD NOT WANT TO UPSET IN
ANY WAY. FURTHERMORE, TURKEY'S ATTACHMENT TO DEMOCRACY
CREATES A NATURAL AFFINITY WITH THE WEST. ECEVIT
FELT TURKEY COULD MAKE A "UNIQUE CONTRIBUTION" TO
WESTERN INTERESTS BY MAKING ITS DEMOCRACY FUNCTION
CONTINUOUSLY AND SMOOTHLY AS AN EXAMPLE TO OTHER
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. MANY IN THE THIRD WORLD
HAVE DOUBTS THAT THIS CAN BE DONE: TURKEY CAN
BE A MODEL. FORTUNATELY THE OTTOMAN TRADITION
IN TURKEY WAS AN EGALITARIAN ONE.

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IT IS NO SECRET THAT TURKISH-US RELATIONS HAD
BEEN PASSING THROUGH A PERIOD OF CRISIS. HOWEVER
THERE HAS NOT BEEN AN "EMOTIONAL" REACTION AGAINST
THE US IN TURKEY SUCH HAD OCCURRED IN GREECE. RPP
HAS CONTRIBUTED MUCH TO THIS BOTH IN GOVERNMENT
AND IN OPPOSITION. IT HAD REFRAINED FROM DOING OR SAYING
ANYTHING THAT WOULD INFLAME ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE US.
ALTHOUGH OUR RELATIONS HAVE BEEN

BAD, SO FAR AS TURKEY IS CONCERNED THE DAMAGE IS NOT
IRREPARABLE. IN HIS ESTIMATION THE SITUATION WAS
DIFFERENT IN THE US, WHERE DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN
RELATIONS HAD BECOME ENTANGLED. THIS MAKES HIM
RESTIVE. HE HOPED SENATE GUESTS WOULD HELP FIND A
REMEDY. UNLESS ONE IS FOUND THIS ENTANGLEMENT
WILL CREATE PROBLEMS FOR THE US IN OTHER COUNTRIES
AS WELL. (REFERENCE IS TO ETHNIC LOBBIES). NEITHER AS A PARTY
NOR A GOVERNMENT WAS THE RPP OVERLY ANXIOUS ABOUT THE
ISSUE OF RATIFICATION OR NON-RATIFICATION OF THE
DEFENSE COOPERATION AGREEMENT. IF THIS AGREEMENT IS REALLY
IN THE INTERESTS OF THE US, IT WILL BE APPROVED. IF IT

IS NOT, "OUR PLEADING WILL NOT MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE".
THIS AGREEMENT MAY BE MARGINAL IN TERMS OF OUR
OVERALL RELATIONS.

HOWEVER TURKISH-US RELATIONS HAVE GOTTEN "TOO
ENTANGLED" WITH TURKISH-GREEK RELATIONS. WE WILL
MAKE THE SAME REQUESTS THAT WE DO WITH THE DCA:
THAT THESE TWO ISSUES BE UNLINKED. EVEN IF THE
US DOES NOT UNLINK THEM, HOWEVER, "WE WILL DO SO".

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USNMR SHAPE

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 ANKARA 0331

LIMDIS

C. CYPRUS. "WE WILL TRY TO SOLVE OUR PROBLEMS WITH GREECE AND
ON CYPRUS WHETHER THE US WANTS THIS OR NOT AND WHETHER
IT WITHHOLDS THE DCA OR NOT. WE ARE ALLIES WITH GREECE,
WE WANT GOOD RELATIONS, WE WANT A SOLUTION ON CYPRUS
WHETHER YOU RATIFY THE DCA OR NOT WE WILL TRY TO
FIX CYPRUS." CYPRUS, HE SAID, WOULD BE THE
PRIMARY AGENDA ITEM IN FOREIGN RELATIONS FOR HIS
GOVERNMENT AFTER THE VOTE OF CONFIDENCE. AS HE

HAD EARLIER TOLD BOTH WALDHEIM AND AMBASSADOR SPIERS,
TURKEY WILL TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN MAKING PROPOSALS
ON BOTH TERRITORY AND CONSTITUTION. TERRITORY
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WILL BE NEGOTIABLE "WITHIN REASONABLE BOUNDS", BUT
THREE YEARS HAVE SOLIDIFIED POSITIONS, AND THE
CHANGES CANNOT BE "SENSATIONAL". TURKEY WANTS
A LASTING AND STABLE SOLUTION WHICH INVOLVES
REAL FEDERATION, NOT JUST ITS APPEARANCE. EVERYONE
SEEMED AGREED ON BOTH THE INEVITABILITY AND
ADVISABILITY OF A FEDERAL SOLUTION. EITHER PARTITION
OR ANNEXATION WAS OUT OF THE QUESTION, ALTHOUGH THERE
HAD TO BE INTERNAL AUTONOMY FOR BOTH COMMUNITIES
WITHIN A FEDERAL FRAMEWORK. IN SUM, TURKEY
WOULD DO EVERYTHING WITHIN ITS POWER TO REACH
A FINAL STABLE AGREEMENT.

D. GREEK RELATIONS. ECEVIT DESCRIBED THE AEGEAN
PROBLEMS WITH GREECE, TERMING THEM "VITAL" FOR TURKEY.
HE RECAPITULATED THE HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THIS ISSUE BUT REAFFIRMED HIS DETERMINATION TO
SEEK A NEGOTIATED AND EQUITABLE SOLUTION TO THE
SEABED AND AIR SPACE PROBLEMS. HE WAS READY TO GIVE GREECE
SOLID ASSURANCES THAT TURKEY HAD NONE OF THE
ULTERIOR MOTIVES WHICH THE GREEKS SAID THEY
SUSPECTED. TURKEY HAD ABSOLUTELY NO DESIRE TO
CHANGE THE STATUS OF THE GREEK ISLANDS AND WAS
PREPARED TO MAKE "CONCRETE GUARANTEES" TO THIS
EFFECT.

TURKEY'S PROBLEMS WITH GREECE WERE NOT UNSOLVABLE.
THEIR JOINT INTERESTS WERE FOR GREATER THAN THE POINTS
OF DISPUTE. TURKEY HAD EVERY INTEREST IN ESTABLISHING
CLOSE FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION IN ALL FIELDS
WITH GREECE. THERE WAS NO BASIC CONFLICT OF
INTEREST BETWEEN THEM. ALL THE PROBLEMS WERE ACCIDENTAL
AND TRANSITORY AND NONE WERE PERMANENT. THEY COULD
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BE SOLVED IN A REASONABLY SHORT TIME. TURKEY AND
GREECE SHOULD BE LEFT ALONE TO SETTLE THEM, ALTHOUGH
THEY SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED BY OTHERS IN THIS PRECESS. HE WAS
DETERMINED TO END THE "NONSENSICAL AND DESTRUCTIVE
ARMS RACE BETWEEN TOW CLOSE ALLIES AND
NEIGHBORS".

D. NEGOTIATIONS ON CYPRUS. THE GREEK CYPRIOTS' ATTITUDE ABOUT KEEPING TURKEY AND GREECE ALOOF FROM THE NEGOTIATIONS WAS UNREALISTIC. THEY SHARED RESPONSIBILITY AS GUARANTOR POWERS. BOTH COUNTRIES HAVE CLOSE INTERESTS IN CYPRUS. (HE RECITED OTHELLO'S LINES ON TURKEY'S INTERESTS IN CYPRUS).

THE FINAL SHIPE OF A CYPRUS SETTLEMENT SHOULD BE DECIDED BY THE TWO COMMUNITIES. PERHAPS, HE SAID, GREECE AND TURKEY SHOULD NOT ACTIVELY PARTICIPATE IN THE NEGOTAITAONS, BUTTHEY SHOULD COME TOGETHER "ON A HIGH POLITICAL LEVLE" AND AGREE ON HOW THEY SHOULD ENCOURAGE THE TWO COMMUNITIES. NO TIME SHOULD BE LOST IN ESTABLISHING A REAL AND FRUITFUL DIALOGUE AT A HIGH LEVEL. HE DID NOT KNOW IF GREECE WOULD BE RECEPTIVE. THE NATURAL TENDENCY HAD BEEN TO CONFINE CONTACT TO A TECHNICAL LEVEL WHICH, IN HIS VIEW, WAS NECESSARY BUT INSUFFICIENT AND SHOULD BE PRECEDED BY THE LAYING DOWN OF AHIGH-LEVEL DIRECTIVE.

E. NATO. TURKEY WOULD WANT TO REMAIN IN AND CONTINUE ITS CONTRIBUTION TO NATO AS LONG AS THE

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S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 ANKARA 0331

LIMDIS

INSTITUTION IS OF LASTING VALUE FOR THE
"BALANCE WHICH IS THE ESSENTIAL FOR PEACE AND
DETENTE". HE DID NOT FORESEE THE CIRCUMSTANCES
IN WHICH NATO WOULD LOSE THIS VALUE. HE WOULD NOT
USE TURKEY'S NATO MEMBERSHIP AS AN INSTRUMENT
OF BLACKMAIL, EITHER AGAINST GREECE OR AGAINST
THE US CONGRESS. THE EXTENT OF TURKEY'S CONTRIBUTION
SHOULD BE DECIDED JOINTLY BY OTHER NATO MEMBERS,
INCLUDING PARTICULARLY THE US. HOWEVER, HE FELT
THAT TURKEY'S CONTRIBUTION AT THIS POINT
WAS INCOMMENSURATE WITH ITS OWN ECONOMY AND THE
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CONTRIBUTION OF OTHERS IN TERMS OF PERCENTAGE
OF GNP DEVOTED TO DEFENSE. IT IS UNREASONABLE
TO EXPECT THIS TO CONTINUE INDEFINITELY AND INDEED,
IT IS MATERIALLY IMPOSSIBLE, PARTICULARLY GIVEN
THE EMBARGO. TURKISH MILITARY EQUIPMENT IS BECOMING UNUSABLE
BECAUSE OF THE SPARE PARTS PROBLEM. ACCORDINGLY
THE CONTRIBUTION THAT TURKEY CAN MAKE TO NATO
DEPENDS DIRECTLY ON THE ATTITUDE OF THE US. HE
DID NOT WANT TURKEY TO BE REGARDED AS A SOURCE
OF THREAT TO "ANY OTHER COUNTRY OF THE REGION" AS
THE RESULT OF ITS NATO MEMBERSHIP. HE DID NOT
WANT TO APPEAR AS AN AGGRESSIVE AGENT AND WANTED
A RELATIONSHIP OF "MUTUAL CONFIDENCE WITH OUR
NEIGHBORS." WE WANT TO MAKE OUR OWN CONTRIBUTION
TO DETENTE".

F. WHAT THE US CAN DO. IN RESPONSE TO SENATOR
RIBICOFF'S QUERY ABOUT WHAT "MESSAGE" THE
SENATORS COULD CARRY TO CARAMANLIS, ECEVIT SAID THAT
THEY COULD EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE THAT HE
ATTACHED TO FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND COOPERATION
IN EVERY FIELD. HE HOPED IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE
TO COOPERATE "OVER THE HEART OF" OUR DIFFICULTIES
EVEN IF SPECIFIC ISSUES CAN NOT NOW BE RESOLVED.
AN OVERALL PATTERN OF COOPERATION MIGHT
MAKE THESE SPECIFIC PROBLEMS DISAPPEAR. ECEVIT
HAD GREAT RESPECT FOR CARAMANLIS, WHOM HE
CHARACTERIZED AS "EXPERIENCED AND RESPONSIBLE".
HE HAS GIVEN PROOF OF THIS IN THE PAST. CARAMANLIS

SHOULD KNOW THAT ECEVIT BELIEVED THAT COOPERATION
IS "NOT ONLY A POSSIBILITY, IT IS A NECESSITY".
THERE IS A "GOLDEN OPPORTUNITY WHEN THE TWO
OF US ARE IN OFFICE TO START A PERIOD OF DIALOGUE
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--NOT ARGUING ABOUT OUR PROBLEMS BUT
COOPERATING IN THEIR SOLUTION. I CAN ONLY HOPE
HE CAN FIND IT POLITICALLY POSSIBLE".

2. COMMENT. SUBSEQUENT SEPARATE DISCUSSION WITH DEMIREL
(AT WHICH CAGLAYANGIL ALSO PRESENT) WAS OF LESS SUBSTATIVE
INTEREST, ALTHOUGH DEMIREL CAME ACROSS AS BEING IN A
PHILOSOPHIC AND STATESMANLIKE MOOD. WHILE HE WAS
SARCASTIC ABOUT RECENT CHANGEOVER (I.E. BUYING OFF
JP MEMBERS WITH CABINET POSTS), HE ALSO SEEMED PROUD
OF DEVELOPING TRADITION OF DEMOCRATIC CHANGEOVER. HE
IMPLIED THAT TURKEY WOULD NOT FIND A WAY TO HAVE
LASTING STABLE GOVERNMENTS UNTIL PRESENT VOTING
SYSTEM, BASED ON PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION, WAS
CHANGED. HE MADE CLEAR HE WOULD BE SUPPORTIVE OF
ECEVIT IN CONNECTION WITH EFFORTS TO RESOLVE CYPRUS
PROBLEM. ALTHOUGH HE DISPLAYED SOME BITTERNESS
ABOUT ARMS EMBARGO, HE EXPLICITLY SAID THAT US-GOT
RELATIONS WERE INFINITELY MORE IMPORTANT THAN CYPRUS.
FINAL CALL ON KORUTURK WAS STRICTLY PROTOCOL.
PRESIDENT REMINISCED AT LENGTH ABOUT US-TURKISH
RELATIONS AND HIS FRIENDSHIP FOR AMERICANS. HIS
HEALTH SEEMED MUCH IMPROVED.
SPIERS

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